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I. INTRODUCTION 
Women too often encounter the argument that pay disparity is the 
outcome of market forces, not sex discrimination.  Salary differentials are 
attributed to individual pay demands, bargaining effectiveness, external 
counteroffers, and prior salaries.  These are just a few examples of market 
justifications that employers raise to explain why similar workers 
performing the same job are compensated differently.  The market defense 
posits that as long as there is a wedge between employees’ reservation 
wages1 and their marginal productivity, wages can be set anywhere in 
between.  Any variance in compensation between two similarly productive 
employees performing the same job is the result of differences in the 
division of the employment contractual surplus in two separate 
employment relationships. 
As union membership continues to decline, and the percentage of 
employees covered by collective bargaining agreements and other fairly 
rigid compensation schemes also declines, most employees face the task of 
bargaining over wages on their own.2  Granting deference to market 
explanations in this individual bargaining setting will hinder the future 
quest for gender pay equality.  Women, on average, tend to be less 
 
* Professor of Law, Radzyner School of Law at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya 
(Israel), and Global Visiting Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. 
 1. The reservation wage is the minimal wage for which a given employee is willing to 
perform a specific job. 
 2. In 2008, union members accounted for only 12.4% of employed wage, and only 
13.7% of salary workers were covered by a union or an employee association contract.  In 
the private sector, only 7.6% of workers were union members, and 8.4% were covered by 
some collective bargaining agreement.  U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
USDL 09-0095, UNION MEMBERS IN 2008, tbls. 1 & 3, (Jan. 22, 2009), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_01282009.pdf.  This data demonstrates 
that nine out of ten workers are not represented with relation to compensation decisions.  
Rather, they are either negotiating individually the terms and conditions of their 
employment or are unilaterally offered employment contracts with no formal or informal 
bargaining. 
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effective bargainers, and in some cases, market justifications are a pretext 
to sex discrimination.3 
To prevail in a compensation discrimination claim under traditional 
discrimination theory, a plaintiff must identify a causal link between 
membership in a protected group, such as being a woman, and her 
relatively low compensation compared to a male co-worker.4  If the 
employer argues successfully that market forces cause this disparity, the 
fact that a woman may be paid less than a man for performing the same 
work is not sufficient to prevail.  The market justification is thus presented 
to overcome the causal link between gender and compensation. 
This Article argues that, usually, market justifications for pay disparity 
in equal-pay-for-equal-work litigation should be rejected.  I do not discuss 
the controversial theory of equal-pay-for-comparable-worth, according to 
which cross-occupational demands for equal pay are made based on a claim 
that the intrinsic worth of the compared occupations or jobs are equivalent, 
although the external market places different value on the jobs at question.5  
My rejection of the market defense pertains only to individuals performing 
the same job. 
The Article then takes on the more ambitious project of proposing an 
alternative model of gender discrimination, which is not restricted to 
causation.  Anti-discrimination mandates outlaw employment practices that 
discriminate against women because of their sex.  I argue that, in the 
limited case of equal pay litigation, we should abandon this causation 
requirement.  The Equal Pay Act of 1963 (“EPA”)6 claims that an 
alternative model of equality should be endorsed, which would restrict an 
employer’s ability to defend differential wages for equal work to cases 
where he can present evidence that individual ability or productivity 
considerations support the disputed pay disparity.  In other words, the 
traditional causation model is based on an irrelevancy test.  Discrimination 
occurs when an employment action is based on an irrelevant factor, such as 
sex.  The other paradigm, which I term “partial causation,” asks whether 
the decision-maker has confined himself to a checklist of relevant factors.7  
Whenever a female employee is compensated at a lower rate than a 
 
 3. See infra notes 29-68 and accompanying text. 
 4. See infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text. 
 5. I reference briefly some of the literature and leading cases based on comparable 
worth claims only to better understand the treatment of the market defense in the context of 
equal pay for equal work.  See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text. 
 6. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006). 
 7. I term this relevancy test as a “partial causation” model because the goal is to 
decrease the gender wage gap, not any unjustified pay inequality.  To trigger review, the 
model insists that you target pay disparity between two workers of opposite sex.  The 
causation requirement is relaxed only regarding the motivation or statistical impact of the 
practice. 
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comparable male employee for the same work, it triggers the obligation to 
inquire whether this can be justified by one of the authorized grounds listed 
explicitly in the Equal Pay Act. 
The distinction between the two models of discrimination parallels the 
distinction between two possible regimes that govern the employment 
relationship regarding job security and the ability of employers to fire their 
employees without cause.  The “employment at will rule,” which is the 
default rule in most jurisdictions, allows an employer to terminate an 
employee for any reason — a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at 
all.8  Specific exceptions to the at will rule are carved out,9 but other than 
these explicit motivations, the employer can base his decision on any 
factor.  The employment at will rule mirrors the causation model of 
discrimination.  Parties to the employment relationship can opt-out of the at 
will rule and institute a termination regime based on “just cause.”10  Under 
a “just cause” rule, the employer’s discretion in termination decisions is 
limited by an identified list of authorized reasons to terminate employees, 
usually relating to performance, discipline, and economic needs.  A “just 
cause” regime is similarly structured  to the proposal of identifying 
discriminatory practices by examining whether the employer was guided by 
one or more of the factors authorized for determining compensation.11 
The gender wage gap is a complex phenomenon.  There are at least 
three causation issues that remain unsettled in the literature discussing the 
gender wage gap.  First, disagreement surrounds the identification of the 
variables responsible for the wage gap.12  Second, the relative significance 
of various contributing factors is disputed.13  Third, the underlying 
 
 8. See Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 118, 118 (1976) (defining the employment at will rule). 
 9. See Thomas J. Miles, Common Law Exceptions to Employment at Will and U.S. 
Labor Markets, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 74, 75 (2000) (listing specific exceptions to the 
employment at will rule). 
 10. Montana is currently the only jurisdiction that opted for a mandatory “just cause” 
regime.  Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-
901 to -914 (2009).  In the unionized sector, however, most collective bargaining 
agreements incorporate job security protection clauses, which limit employer’s prerogative 
to terminate employees according to a restricted list of events. 
 11. I thank Cindy Estlund for pointing out the similarity between job security regimes 
and the two possibilities of conceptualizing discriminatory practice. 
 12. See Francine D. Blau & Marianne A. Ferber, Discrimination:  Empirical Evidence 
from the United States, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 316, 316 (1987) (reviewing theories used in 
determining the extent of discrimination; Alan Manning & Joanna Swaffield, The Gender 
Gap in Early-Career Wage Growth, 118 ECON. J. 983, 983 (2008) (exploring reason for the 
UK’s gender gap in early-career wage growth). 
 13. See Stephanie Boraas & William M. Rodgers III, How Does Gender Play a Role in 
the Earnings Gap?  An Update, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 2003, at 9, 9 (noting that 
although the existence of the gender pay gap is well documented, the factors that contribute 
to it are still debated); Dan A. Black, Amelia M. Haviland, Seth G. Sanders & Lowell J. 
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relationship between some factors and past and present societal 
discrimination is also often questioned.14  In this climate of empirical 
uncertainty, adherence to a definition of discrimination, which requires the 
plaintiff to articulate causality between the employer’s seemingly neutral 
and market-guided compensation policies and sex, will frustrate most 
claims of pay discrimination.  Broad interpretation of what constitutes a 
valid defense may undermine the EPA’s goal of eliminating unjustified 
wage disparities.  Some defenses, especially variants of the market force 
defense, are actually discriminatory practices since they disadvantage 
women as a group. 
The courts overlooked the opportunity to interpret the EPA as 
restricting employer’s discretion to disparately compensate employees of 
opposite sexes to a checklist of authorized factors relating to productivity 
and ability.15  Currently, EPA jurisprudence is under-theorized.  In a series 
of decisions, the courts interpreted the EPA to emulate Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 196416 models of discrimination, which are based on 
strong causation.17  Employers were able to make use of the market defense 
to sever the causal link between sex and compensation.  However, in 
January 2009, Congress passed H.R. 12, the Paycheck Fairness Act.18  This 
bill, amending the EPA, clarifies that the scope of the employer’s 
affirmative defense is quite narrow and in fact, is limited to considerations 
closely related to individual ability and productivity.  If this important 
legislation becomes law, the market defense will be eliminated altogether 
from the EPA framework of discrimination. 
This Article proceeds as follows:  Part II explores what employers 
 
Taylor, Gender Wage Disparities among the Highly Educated, 43 J. HUM. RESOURCES 630, 
631 (2008) (discussing the widely different regression specifications and different data sets 
used in the literature studying the gender wage gap); Marianne Bertrand, Claudia Goldin & 
Lawrence E. Katz, Dynamics of the Gender Gap for Young Professionals in the Financial 
and Corporate Sectors 3-4(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14681, 
2009), available at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/goldin/files/Dynamics.pdf 
(identifying three proximate factors that may explain the large and rising gender gap in 
earnings). 
 14. See Jane Waldfogel, Understanding the “Family Gap” in Pay for Women with 
Children, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 137 (1998) (examining the wage differential between women 
with and without children); Daniel Fischel & Edward Lazear, Comparable Worth and 
Discrimination in Labor Markets, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 891 (1986) (providing a critique of 
comparable worth that does not depend on acceptance of the market price as dispositive). 
 15. See infra notes 126-142 and accompanying text for a discussion of the judicial 
oversight. 
 16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006).  Title VII prohibits employment-related 
discrimination on the basis of five group membership classifications:  race, color, national 
origin, sex, and religion. 
 17. See discussion infra Parts III.A-B. 
 18. Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 12, 111th Cong. (2009), available at 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-12.  The bill is pending in the Senate. 
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assert when offering a market defense to discriminatory compensation 
claims.  It offers the normative analysis of why the market defense should 
be rejected.  It draws on the growing body of research demonstrating 
gender differences in negotiation skills, self entitlement, and competitive 
behavior.  Part III explains how traditional models of discrimination, based 
on causation, are ill-equipped to deal with pay disparities resulting from 
market behavior of individual employees.  Part IV develops the argument 
that we should abandon the causation requirement for pay disparity claims, 
substituting it with a checklist of relevant factors which will govern 
compensation decisions.  It then explains why the EPA was interpreted as 
embracing a causation model, although its structure clearly indicates a 
departure from traditional discrimination models.  Part IV also discusses 
the Paycheck Fairness Act.  If passed, this bill will settle the ambiguity 
surrounding the reach of the market defense.19  Part V concludes with a 
response to criticism voiced against eliminating the market defense from 
the EPA. 
II. WHY ARE SOME MARKET JUSTIFICATIONS TO THE GENDER WAGE GAP 
DISCRIMINATORY? 
A. What Are Market Justifications? 
A market explanation harnesses free market principles, such as supply 
and demand equilibrium, promotion of self interest, and/or profit 
maximization to justify contested wage disparities.  Early on, employers 
turned to market justifications to distance themselves from accusations that 
their animus toward women (and other protected groups) motivated their 
adverse decisions.20  Basically their defense culminated in asserting “it’s 
not me, it’s the market, which forced me to treat women unfavorably.”  In 
effect, two market theory assumptions were brought together.  First, 
employers are usually not wage setters, but rather wage takers - following 
the market rate, which is dictated by the supply and demand for employees 
in the specific industry or profession.  Second, efficient labor markets will 
gradually eliminate any irrational or animus-based discrimination.  The 
concept that an employer can excuse sex-based decision-making with 
rational and profit maximizing reasoning (as opposed to animus) was 
quickly dismissed by the Supreme Court.  In Corning Glass Works v. 
Brennan,21 women inspectors working the day shift demanded pay equal to 
 
 19. The Supreme Court has declined to settle this question in Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist. 
v. Aldrich, 506 U.S. 965 (1992). 
 20. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974). 
 21. Id. 
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that of male inspectors working the night shift.  For other jobs, there was 
one wage rate applied both to day and night shifts.  Corning argued that the 
wage differential between day and night shift inspection jobs resulted from 
the resistance of men to perform inspection work - work perceived by these 
workers as demeaning feminine tasks.22  In order to fill the night shift, 
Corning had to offer higher compensation than that offered to women 
working the day shift.  The Court determined that “the differential arose 
simply because men would not work at the low rates paid to women 
inspectors, and it reflected a job market in which Corning could pay 
women less than men for the same work.  That the company took 
advantage of such a situation may be understandable as a matter of 
economics, but its differential nevertheless became illegal once Congress 
enacted into law the principle of equal pay for equal work.”23 
After the Court held that the EPA prohibited compensation decisions 
that consider sex, even if such pay disparities are supported by market 
justification, a more subtle form of the market justification emerged.  One 
variation focuses on the legitimacy of the employer attempting to extract as 
much of the contractual surplus as possible.  In these cases, for example, an 
employer argues that there is no legal obligation to offer individual workers 
more than their initial pay demands, even if implementation of a wage 
scheme based on employee wage demands ultimately disadvantages 
women.24  Another strand emphasizes specific circumstances where 
 
 22. Id. at 205. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See, e.g., Horner v. Mary Inst., 613 F.2d 706 (8th Cir. 1980) (The plaintiff, a female 
physical education teacher, accepted an initial job offer of $7,500.  Subsequently, a male 
teacher was hired, but did not accept the initial offer of $7,500 and demanded $9,000.  
Special authorization by the school’s governing board was given to meet this compensation 
demand.  The court accepts this as a legitimate reason for the pay disparity, a reason other 
than sex);  see also Walter v. KFGO Radio, 518 F. Supp. 1309 (D.N.D. 1981) (Individual 
negotiations for initial pay that resulted in higher pay for a male employee performing the 
same job is not a violation of the EPA).  Even the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, in its compliance manual for avoiding compensation discrimination, instructs 
employers that as long as the employer treats women and men similarly when engaging in 
compensation negotiations, any pay differentiation resulting from the negotiations is to be 
attributed to a factor other than sex:  “CP, a certified public accountant (CPA), claims that R 
accounting firm violated the EPA by offering her a lower starting salary than it offered a 
male CPA. R proves that it offered a higher salary to the male because he had very favorable 
job references based on his productivity and successful track record in providing tax advice 
to clients; he received other job offers at the higher salary; and he relied on those job offers 
as a bargaining tool for negotiating the higher salary.  R began salary discussions with CP 
with the same opening offer as given to the male, and indicated it was ‘willing to go higher 
if necessary.’  But CP did not bargain as assertively as the male CPA, and ended up with a 
lower starting salary.  There is no evidence that R treated CP any differently than the male 
in salary negotiations.  R has proved that the compensation disparity is based on a factor 
other than sex, and therefore no EPA violation is found.”  EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, COMPLIANCE MANUAL, § 10 ex. 42 (2000), available at 
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employers are compelled by external market pressures to raise the 
compensation of one employee but not another.  For example, an employee 
presents a counteroffer and threatens to quit if his current employer does 
not match it.25  Similarly, temporal changes in the market wage in an 
industry or profession can result in disparate compensation of two equally 
productive employees, hired in separate time periods.26 
The strength of these new versions of the market defense is that they 
purport to sanction neutral criteria that regrettably resulted in an individual 
female employee being paid less than a male co-worker,27 rather than being 
offered as a justification for an intentionally sex-based compensation 
decision.  Employers have utilized these versions of the market justification 
to overcome the causal link between sex and compensation level that a 
plaintiff must prove under the traditional theory of discrimination.  Courts 
have accepted this line of reasoning in varying degrees.28 
In the next subsections, this paper explores whether market 
explanations do, in fact, undermine the causal link between wages and 
gender.  I set out to prove two assertions:  First, despite being neutral on 
their face, some market justifications adversely impact women as a group, 
and therefore, the causal link between gender and pay is still present.  
 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/compensation.html. 
 25. See, e.g., Taylor v. White, 321 F.3d 710 (8th Cir. 2003) (The employer asserted a 
retention policy as a gender-neutral defense to the employee's unequal pay claim.  The court 
rejected the employee's argument that a salary retention policy could not serve as a factor 
other than sex if it resulted in pay disparity between men and women); Winkes v. Brown 
Univ., 747 F.2d 792, 792 (1st Cir. 1984) (An associate professor alleged that the raise given 
to his female colleague was in violation of the EPA, after defendant matched the salary 
offered to a female associate professor by another institution in order to dissuade her from 
taking other employment.  The court found that defendant sufficiently demonstrated that it 
had a customary de facto policy of responding to outside offers from other universities when 
it desired to keep a professor and his or her qualities merited such an action). 
 26. See, e.g., Ciardella v. Carson City Sch. Dist., 671 F. Supp. 699, 701 (D. Nev. 1987) 
(Explaining that due to economic changes in  the job market, the employer was required to 
extend an offer of compensation of approximately $10,000 more per year than the plaintiff 
was receiving while performing the same job). 
 27. Another commentator made a similar distinction dubbing the Corning Glass type of 
market defense as the market conditions defense and the newer version as a market value 
defense:  “The market value defense differs from the market conditions defense in one 
important aspect.  Under the market value defense, the defendant attempts to prove an actual 
difference in market demand for a particular employee.  Under the market conditions 
defense, the defendant makes broad assumptions about an entire class of employees based 
on sex.  The Court in Corning Glass clearly rejected a defense based on broad assumptions 
about market conditions.  Because the market value defense more strongly reflects a 
defendant's prudent business judgment, however, the issue of whether courts should accept a 
market value defense is a closer question.”  Thomas H. McCarthy, Jr., Note, "Market Value" 
as a Factor "Other Than Sex" in Sex-Based Wage Discrimination Claims, 1985 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1027, 1037 (1985). 
 28. See infra discussion of case law in section IV.C. 
RABINFINAL[1] 6/1/2010  10:44:58 AM 
814 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 12:3 
 
Second, employers sometimes claim that their decisions are constrained by 
external market pressures, when in fact their decisions are not subject to 
such pressures.  Rather their compensation schemes are a product of 
internal institutional policies and politics that are sometimes entangled with 
gender stereotypes and other sex-based considerations.  If this is an 
accurate description of labor market practices, market justifications as a 
normative matter should not be accepted as a legitimate defense in pay 
discrimination cases.  Denying such defenses will also promote uniformity 
and coherence in the treatment of market-based defenses that disadvantage 
women. 
B.  Market Justifications Feed and Perpetuate the Gender Wage Gap 
In their influential book, Women Don’t Ask:  Negotiation and the 
Gender Gap, Linda Babcock and Sara Laschever present empirical 
evidence on the difference between the manner in which women and men 
engage in salary negotiations.29  The results of their research pose 
disturbing implications for the impact of allowing market justifications 
upon the gender wage gap.  The essence of their findings is that women are 
more hesitant than men to initiate and pursue negotiations over wages.30  
Women are less likely than men to negotiate over initial wage offers when 
accepting a new job.31  They are also less likely than men to demand a raise 
or seek counteroffers to boost their current compensation.32  The different 
negotiation skills that women and men bring to the bargaining table impact 
the gender wage distribution in institutions that rely heavily on individual 
bargaining to set wages. 
The book first illustrates the disparity in starting salaries of graduates 
with a master’s degree from Carnegie Melon University.  Male graduates 
received an initial average salary 7.6% higher than that of female 
graduates.33  The cause of the gendered differential in the average wage 
was that 57% of men negotiate over the initial offer they received, while 
only 7% of the female graduates did so.34  This data shows that a majority 
of men used an initial salary offer as a starting point for negotiations, while 
most women simply accepted the initial offer. 
The researchers point to the attainment of early childhood social skills 
as the explanation for the difference in negotiation skills.  Boys are 
 
 29. LINDA BABCOCK & SARAH LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK: NEGOTIATION AND THE 
GENDER DIVIDE (2002). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 1-2. 
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encouraged to ask for things they want and tend to believe that they have 
control over the circumstances that shape their lives.  Young girls are 
taught to focus on the needs of others and to apply less control in altering 
their own situation.  Therefore, women are less inclined than men to come 
forward and demand raises, bargain over initial wages, or approach other 
employers to solicit competing job offers.35 
Another line of research complementing the gender negotiation 
literature investigates the correlation between competitive behavior and 
gender.  Muriel Niedele has been conducting experiments demonstrating 
that women shy away from competitive environments, while men not only 
welcome them, but perform better when competing.36  Wage negotiations 
are commonly seen as a competition, and women tend to avoid it.  Again, 
the variance in attitudes and performance in a competitive setting is linked 
to the development of early social skills and a disparity in the self-
confidence women and men exhibit in their belief in the chances of 
winning the competition.37  These beliefs affect both one’s willingness to 
compete and performance in competition.  The negotiation literature also 
emphasizes the importance of the negotiator’s self-confidence and 
optimism.  There is correlation between self–confidence, optimism, and the 
final outcome of the negotiation:  If you expect more, you will get more.38 
Tied to these findings are experimental studies, revealing that women, 
absent external information, value the economic worth of their work less 
than do men.39  In one of the first studies on self-perception of entitlement, 
participants were requested to perform a task.40  After completion of the 
task, participants were divided into two groups.41  The first group was 
 
 35.  See id. at 62-84. 
 36. See generally Uri Gneezy, Muriel Niederle & Aldo Rustichini, Performance in 
Competitive Environments:  Gender Differences, 118 Q. J. OF ECON. 1049 (2003) (stating 
that when women and men compete against one another, women may perform less well than 
men, even if they perform similarly in non-competitive environments); Muriel Niederle & 
Lisa Vesterlund, Gender Differences in Competition, 24 NEGOTIATION J. 447 (2008) 
[hereinafter Gender Differences]; Muriel Niederle & Lisa Vesterlund, Do Women Shy Away 
from Competition? Do Men Compete Too Much?, 122 Q. J. OF ECON. 1067 (2007) 
[hereinafter Women Shy Away]. 
 37. See Gender Differences in Competition, supra note 36, at 456-57. 
 38. See Babcock & Laschever, supra note 29, at 130-42. 
 39. See Hart Blanton et al., Contexts of System Justification and System Evaluation: 
Exploring the Social Comparison Strategies of the (Not Yet) Contented Female Worker, 4 
GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 126 (2001) (comparing women’s satisfaction with 
pay rate with men’s); Brett W. Pelham & John J. Hetts, Underworked and Overpaid: 
Elevated Entitlement in Men's Self-Pay, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 93 (2001) 
(discussing University of California study on depressed entitlement). 
 40. See Charlene M. Callahan-Levy & Lawrence A. Messe, Sex Differences in the 
Allocation of Pay, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 433 (1979) (interpreting results of a 
study at Michigan State University). 
 41. Id. 
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asked to assign compensation to themselves for performing the task.42  The 
second group was asked to decide the compensation other participants 
received for the task.43  On average, women in the first group assigned 19% 
lower compensation for themselves than men did, but when compensating 
other participants, women were slightly more generous than men regardless 
of the sex of the participant they were compensating.44  However, there was 
no difference in the participants’ evaluation of the quality of their work.45  
These results show that women undervalue their work but are able to more 
objectively assess the value of others’ work.  Men, on the other hand, did 
not exhibit such a discrepancy.  A follow up study included a third group, 
which was required to assign compensation to themselves, like the first 
group, but were provided with a bogus list containing information on how 
much other participants paid themselves.  Under these conditions, women 
adjusted their compensation upward to meet the rates included in the list.46  
The results of this study suggest that a lack of information about the going 
rate of compensation tends to depress women’s wages and contributes to 
the gender wage gap47. 
These empirical findings can also shed light on why women’s 
reservation wage is often lower than men’s.  The conventional explanation 
emphasizes market discrimination48 and the greater variance in women’s 
attachment to the paid labor market than men’s.49  But a low self-valuation 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. Two decades later, at Yale College, female students still paid themselves 18% 
less than male students did, for work that was indistinguishable in quality or content.  John 
T. Jost, An Experimental Replication of the Depressed-Entitlement Effect Among Women, 21 
PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 387 (1997).  In another experiment, participants were instructed to 
perform a task until they thought they earned four dollars.  Women worked on average 22% 
longer than men and were 32% more productive than men.  Brenda Major et al., 
Overworked and Underpaid:  On the Nature of Gender Differences in Personal Entitlement, 
47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1399 (1984). 
 46. Major, supra note 45. 
 47. See also Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 550 U.S. 618, 650 (2007) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority opinion, which denies an Equal Pay Act 
claim).  Justice Ginsburg references the importance of allowing women to access reliable 
information on compensation when combating compensation discrimination in the 
workplace.  The Paycheck Fairness Act similarly addresses the issue of the lack of vital 
wage information.  The bill institutes a retaliatory cause of action against employers who 
retaliate against employees that engage in information sharing and inquire about wages.  It 
also requires the EEOC to survey pay data and obligates employers to submit any needed 
pay data identified by the race, sex and national origin of employees.  The Paycheck 
Fairness Act §§ 3, 8, supra note 188. 
 48. See Heather Antecol & Peter Kuhn, Gender as an Impediment to Labor Market 
Success:  Why Do Young Women Report Greater Harm?, 18 J. LAB. ECON. 702 (2000) 
(analyzing effects of age and gender on employment). 
 49. See Audra Bowlus, A Search Interpretation of Male-Female Wage Differentials, 15 
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of one’s work, whether intrinsic or caused by a lack of relevant and 
accurate information, depresses women’s reservation wage.  There is a 
correlation between a high estimation of the market value of the job 
performed and a high reservation wage.50  Holding productivity constant, a 
lower reservation wage translates into a larger contractual surplus to be 
divided between the employer and employees.  Even if the employer 
extracts an identical share of the surplus through bargaining, the employee 
will end up with lower wages than a co-worker whose reservation wage 
was initially set higher. 
To illustrate the insights discussed so far, take for example two 
employees, Emma and Ben, with equivalent productivity of $100 per day.  
This sets the upper limit to their compensation at a rate of $100 per day.  
Due to the constraints described above, Emma values her productivity at 
$80, while Ben estimates his productivity at $95.  Emma sets her 
reservation wage, which is the minimum wage she is willing to work for, at 
$50 and Ben sets it at $60.  The fact that Emma estimates her productivity 
will be lower than Ben does not necessitate that her reservation wage must 
also be lower; she could be unwilling to work for less than $75 a day, even 
if she estimates her productivity only at $85.51  The contractual surplus in 
Emma’s case is $50 and in Ben’s case it is only $40.  This puts Ben at an 
advantage, because even if in both cases bargaining will result in splitting 
the surplus evenly, Emma will end up with a wage rate of $75 per day and 
Ben with $80.  Taking into account their subjective evaluations of their 
productivities, Emma estimates the contractual surplus at $30 compared to 
Ben’s estimate of $35.  Splitting the employee-perceived surplus evenly in 
both cases will result in $65 for Emma and $77.50 for Ben. 
When incorporating the information about the systemic differences in 
the way women and men approach and handle wage negotiation, it is fair to 
assume that Ben will be able to extract a higher share of the actual 
employment contractual surplus.  Emma may not engage in bargaining at 
all, and if she does, she will be less effective.  Emma will set her 
bargaining goals lower, partly because both her reservation wage and 
subjective estimation of her productivity is lower than Ben’s, and partly 
 
J. LAB. ECON. 625 (1997) (showing that differences in anticipated labor force attachment led 
to lower reservation wages for women). 
 50. See Peter Orazem, James Werbel & James McElroy, Market Expectations, Job 
Search, and Gender Differences in Starting Pay, 24  J. LAB. RESEARCH 307 (2003) 
(demonstrating that women had lower starting salary expectations, even with the same 
major, labor market information and job search strategies; lower pay expectations led to 
lower pay outcome for women). 
 51. I structured the dollar amounts in the example to mirror the findings that women on 
average estimate their productivity lower than men and also have a lower reservation wage.  
It is also a plausible assumption that when you estimate your productivity at a lower rate 
there is a depressing effect on your reservation wage. 
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because she is not socialized to bargain for her own benefit and is averse to 
the competitive environment of wage negotiations.  If this results in Emma 
extracting 10% of the surplus while Ben succeeds in extracting 20%, 
Emma will be compensated at a rate of $55 compared to Ben’s 
compensation of $72. 
This hypothetical example illustrates that various factors pertaining to 
individual salary negotiation may contribute to gender wage disparity.  
None of these factors is connected to any objective measure of 
productivity, but some are linked to gender, and adversely impacting 
women, thus meeting the causation requirement underlying traditional 
discrimination law, under disparate impact law. 
C. Market Justifications May Serve as a Pretext for Discriminatory 
Behavior 
The strand of the market justification, emphasizing external market 
pressures, assumes that both employers and employees are “price takers” in 
the sense that the external market determines the wage rate for industries 
and occupation.  Under this theory, the only discretion an employer 
exercises is determining how many employees they are willing to hire at 
the going wage.  It is thus argued that when the employer is not the one 
who is actively setting wages, but simply following the market rate, he 
should not be held liable for the external valuation of worth.52 
This intuition is probably one of the main causes for the failure of the 
comparable worth movement.  In the late seventies to mid eighties, 
comparable worth proponents advanced, unsuccessfully, the argument that 
when job segregation results in the depression of wages of female 
occupations compared to comparably worth male occupation, this should 
be perceived as sex discrimination.53  But courts resisted expansion of 
discrimination law based on this theory, explaining that when an employer 
pays his workers according to the market’s going wage, wages are not 
actively set in a discriminatory manner.  The employer is simply following 
the rules of supply and demand for the various jobs, even if the outcome is 
that female-dominated occupations attain lower compensation levels than 
comparably worth male-dominated occupations.54  The rejection of 
 
 52. An exception to the underlying assumption that employers should not be held liable 
for following the market wage rate are cases in which the employer intentionally classifies 
employees by sex to take advantage of women’s lower reservation, as was the situation in 
the Corning Glass plant.  Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 215 (1974). 
 53. See generally Paul Weiler, The Wages of Sex:  The Uses and Limits of Comparable 
Worth, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1728 (1986) (arguing that there is real value in comparable worth). 
 54. The final blow to the endeavor to incorporate comparable worth into Title VII was 
in American Nurses' Association v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 722 (7th Cir. 1986) (allowing a 
suit by nurses on separate discrimination grounds, but denying the applicability of 
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comparable worth rested partially on the strong belief that employers are 
wage takers for the various occupations for which they hire workers.55 
In the past decade, new sociological research challenged the 
assumption that employers are mere wage takers when determining 
compensation.  In some cases, internal institutional constraints and politics 
play a greater role than we (and the courts) are willing to acknowledge.  
Although employers are taking into account prevailing market wage rates 
for the relevant positions at issue,56 they are also influenced by internal 
power dynamics and patterns of conflict vis-à-vis different groups of 
employees.  This may result in managerial decisions to compensate some 
groups or occupations beyond the rate warranted by external market 
constraints. 
Although this research targets gender-based occupational segregation, 
it is also relevant to the general discussion about the validity of the market 
defense.  The market defense draws its strength from the assertion that 
wages are determined by external forces.  If this premise questioned by 
empirical analysis, employers can no longer claim that they are not actively 
participating in setting wages.  If they have some input in determining 
wages, and consciously decide to adhere to demands of specific groups of 
employees by compensating them above the market rate and this decision 
results in pay disparity between men and women, then this could be 
conceptualized as sex discrimination.  At this point, pay disparity would 
not be the product of adhering to the external market valuation, but rather 
following some internal process of institutional decision-making.  If this is 
the case, the market cannot be blamed for the wage disparity across 
individuals or groups of employees. 
In Legalizing Gender Inequality:  Courts, Markets and Unequal Pay 
for Women in America,57 sociologists Robert Nelson and William Bridges 
conduct a thorough qualitative investigation, which they term “critical 
 
comparable worth). 
 55. See AFSCME v.  State of Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1408 (1985) (“The State of 
Washington's initial reliance on a free market system in which employees in male-
dominated jobs are compensated at a higher rate than employees in dissimilar female-
dominated jobs is not in and of itself a violation of Title VII, notwithstanding that the Willis 
study deemed the positions of comparable worth.  Absent a showing of discriminatory 
motive, which has not been made here, the law does not permit the federal courts to interfere 
in the market-based system for the compensation of Washington's employees.”); Briggs v. 
Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wis. 1982) (granting dismissal of a sex discrimination 
claim where the defendant argued that higher market wages for sanitarians than for nurses 
were responsible for pay disparities between female and male employees). 
 56. Usually pay does not fall under the prevailing market rate. 
 57. ROBERT L. NELSON & WILLIAM P. BRIDGES, LEGALIZING GENDER INEQUALITY: 
COURTS, MARKETS, AND UNEQUAL PAY FOR WOMEN IN AMERICA (Cambridge University 
Press 1999). 
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empiricism,” into four high profile comparable worth cases.58  They 
examine whether market forces, as argued by the defendants and accepted 
by the courts, were the cause of the pay disparity across gendered 
occupations.  As students of organizational behavior, they are interested in 
understanding how organizations unconsciously effectuate gender 
inequality. 
In one of the cases, Christensen v. Iowa,59 female clerical workers 
filed a pay discrimination lawsuit against the University of Northern 
Iowa.60  They claimed that they were underpaid in comparison to male 
physical plant workers, even though both occupations were assigned 
identical pay grades in an internal job evaluation report.61  Specifically, the 
report stated that physical plant workers were overpaid relative to clerical 
workers and that the physical plant workers’ pay was inflated compared to 
external market pay rates for similar jobs.62  The University chose not to 
implement the recommendations; it sincerely feared that it would not be 
able to attract physical plant workers at the wage rate that it was paying the 
predominantly female clerical workers.63  The market justification was not 
presented as an excuse for conscious sex discrimination and a deliberate 
decision to pay male occupations more, but rather as an unconscious 
process in which internal power structures affected how management 
perceived market rates for the gendered jobs.64 
The University’s perception that it could not lower the current wages 
of physical plant workers was based on the organizational strength of that 
group of workers.  “The Physical plant workers, informally known as the 
‘meatpackers’, because of their identification with unionized workers 
engaged in self-conscious collective bargaining.  The clerical workers, in 
contrast, were content to participate in amicable ‘committee’ meetings with 
university officials.”65  This led the University to “worry about the union 
guys but not the women”.66  The authors argue that while the employer was 
speaking in terms of the market to justify its pay scheme “the market did 
not compel the University’s decision.  Organizational politics compelled 
the University to give selective attention to the demands of workers in 
predominantly male jobs.”67 
 
 58. See id. at 101-05. 
 59. Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977). 
 60. Id. at 354 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Nelson & Bridges, supra note 57, at 156-58. 
 64. Id. at 160-66. 
 65. Id. at 162. 
 66. Id. at 166. 
 67. Id. 
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This study, as well as others,68 demonstrate that even if we generally 
embrace the market defense, i.e. accept wage disparities resulting from 
external market forces, we  may encounter circumstances where what 
initially is deemed an external factor turns out to be an internal institutional 
decision unrelated to external market wage rates.  Since discerning which 
cases carry a true market component and which reflect institutional politics 
and structures is a tricky matter, we should be extremely suspicious of any 
market claim presented. 
D. Current Treatment of Market Justifications is Inconsistent 
Paying women less than men just because the employer realizes he 
can hire women for less pay than men is discriminatory.69  This type of 
behavior falls neatly within the traditional framework of antidiscrimination 
theory.  The employer is basing employment decisions, compensation, on 
the applicant’s or employee’s gender and is offering less pay, because an 
applicant or employee is a woman.  The causation requirement is clearly 
met, despite the employer’s ability to differentiate compensation based on 
factors external to his operation.  On the other hand, when an employer 
bases compensation decisions on factors other than sex, and these other 
factors are not related to ability or productivity, the law is ambiguous.  In 
that situation, courts implicitly instruct that as long as the employer did not 
resort to sex-based classifications, he is on safe grounds.  The employer is 
free to construct whatever wage structure he desires, extracting profit from 
the fact that reservation wages, compensation expectations, and negotiation 
skills vary among the pool of similar job applicants. 
However, relying on a market justification can result, in both 
scenarios, in gender wage disparities.   In Corning Glass Works v. 
Brennan70 and Christensen v. Iowa,71 the employer explained his wage 
structure in terms of external market constraints or opportunities (to pay 
women less than men).  In both cases, external market valuations were 
blamed for generating the internal gender wage disparity.  The reason the 
University of Iowa prevailed, while Corning failed, relates to the source of 
the employer’s own classification.  Corning confessed it classified 
employees based on sex, while the University of Iowa admitted only to 
 
 68. See Robert L. Nelson, Ellen C. Berrey & Laura Beth Nielsen, Divergent Paths: 
Conflicting Conceptions of Employment Discrimination in Law and the Social Sciences, 4 
ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 103 (2008) (surveying social scientific research which documents 
the pervasiveness of unintentional bias and the persistence of organizational processes that 
generate workplace discrimination). 
 69. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 215 (1974) (espousing this 
rationale). 
 70. Id. 
 71. 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977). 
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classification based on occupation.  Usually, employers arguing that the 
sources of the pay disparity are classifications or factors other than sex can 
successfully defend their market explanation. 
This doctrinal inconsistency in addressing market arguments is driven 
by the centrality of the causation model.  Only in cases such as Corning 
Glass, where evidence that a causal link between the sex of the plaintiffs 
and the compensation decision exists, are the courts willing to dismiss the 
market defense.72  In other cases resulting in similar pay discrepancies 
between men and women, the market justification is given credence.73  
After all, no causal link between the compensation practice and the sex of 
the plaintiffs was articulated, and the courts respect the employer’s 
apparently nondiscriminatory business judgment.74 
The similarity between these two scenarios warrants parallel treatment 
of the market defense.  In both cases, the employer is not driven by animus 
toward women, but rather by profit maximization considerations.  In both 
cases, women’s wages are adversely affected by a compensation policy, 
contributing to the gender wage disparity.  The fact that in the latter case 
one cannot pinpoint the causal process that connects the decision to gender 
should not serve as a strong basis for sanctioning market arguments.  The 
rationale of Corning Glass Works—that an employer cannot pay women 
less than men for performing the same work—should govern all 
circumstances of market driven wage disparities. 
 
 72. Other cases clarifying this point are Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235, 241 
n.12 (5th Cir. 1973)  (stating that: 
“Loveman's contends that the tighter market for salesmen and male tailors 
justifies its hiring of men with such skills at a rate higher than that paid to obtain 
women of similar skills.  While factors other than sex (customer embarrassment 
primarily) justify the employer in seeking male personnel to work in 
conjunction with selling and fitting male clothing, this is no excuse for hiring 
saleswomen and seamstresses at lesser rates simply because the market will 
bear it.  Just such disparities were what Congress intended to correct by this 
legislation.”).   
See also Hodgson v. Brookhaven General Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 726 (5th Cir. 1970) 
("Clearly the fact that the employer's bargaining power is greater with respect to women 
than with respect to men is not the kind of factor [other than sex] Congress had in mind. 
Thus it will not do for the hospital to press the point that it paid orderlies more because it 
could not get them for less.”). 
 73. See supra notes 24-26 and infra notes 127-131 and accompanying text. 
 74. See McCarthy, supra note 27, at 1042 (“If the defendant must pay certain 
employees more either to attract or to keep those employees, then prudent business 
judgment would require that the defendant pay those employees more. The defendant’s 
business judgment is facially nondiscriminatory.”). 
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III. THE DIFFICULTY OF USING TRADITIONAL DISCRIMINATION MODELS 
TO CONFRONT MARKET JUSTIFICATIONS 
A. The Traditional Discrimination Framework:  Emphasizing Causation 
The market-defense controversy presents a challenge to employment 
discrimination theory due to the centrality of causation in conceptualizing 
discrimination in American law.  Fundamentally, discrimination is 
understood to be the action of treating people differently on the basis of 
some prohibited group classification.75  In the case of sex discrimination, it 
is taking action based on gender.  The causal link between the scrutinized 
action and group membership must be articulated. 
Title VII embraces the causation requirement both in its disparate 
treatment model and disparate impact model.  The causation requirement is 
salient in disparate treatment theory.  The ultimate question in any 
disparate treatment litigation is whether a plaintiff was able to meet her 
burden of persuasion and demonstrate that sex (or any other regulated 
group membership category) was a motivating factor in the employment 
decision.76  There are a couple of ways to meet this burden.  A plaintiff 
could resort to direct evidence or circumstantial evidence (including 
statistical evidence).77  Nevertheless, at the end of the day, she must 
convince the fact finder that her gender was a motivating factor in the final 
decision regarding compensation, denial of promotion, termination, or 
sexual harassment. 
In disparate impact theory, the centrality of the causation requirement 
is covert, but nonetheless present.  Under disparate impact theory,78 a 
plaintiff argues that an employment practice adversely impacts members of 
a protected group.  This is a statistical claim.  The claim is that there is a 
strong statistical correlation between group membership and the 
employment practice.  If no data on statistical correlation are offered, the 
 
 75. See Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 834, 859-
867 (2000) (surveying the justifications for the group-based theory of discrimination). 
 76. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (stating that 
acceptable evidence of discrimination for an ADEA claim was present); St. Mary’s Honor 
Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993) (rejecting idea that nondiscriminatory interest 
completely destroys a discrimination claim). 
 77. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (stating 
that a legitimate reason eliminates the need to prove nondiscriminatory intent); 
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 (2002) (holding that a race and age discrimination 
complaint does not require a pleading to be more detailed than normal). 
 78. See Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (initially articulating disparate 
impact).  The disparate impact framework was later codified in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2(k). 
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employer is not required to defend his decision making process.79  Since 
disparate impact is based on providing statistical data on the correlation 
between employment practices and group membership, it also entails a 
causation requirement.  Although the plaintiff is relieved of the requirement 
to demonstrate that employment actions were based on group membership, 
she is still obliged to demonstrate the statistical correlation (i.e. impact) 
between employment practices and group membership. 
B. Limitation of the Causation Model in Addressing Gender Wage 
Disparities 
i. Disparate Treatment Law 
Disparate treatment law is ill-suited to deal with gender pay disparity 
resulting from market considerations.  An employer can avoid liability if 
they can persuade the fact finder that pay decisions were solely based on 
other factors than the employee’s gender.  Offering market justifications for 
the decision severs the causal link between the sex of the plaintiff and the 
lower compensation level.  A genuine external market justification does not 
fit within the causation model described.  It is not because of the plaintiff’s 
sex that she was paid less than another co-worker performing the same 
work, but because of a factor unrelated to sex - such as the fact she did not 
demand annual raises, did not negotiate her initial salary, or another factor 
which is not regulated by law. 
As discussed above, in disparate treatment litigation, plaintiffs will 
only prevail in the limited cases in which they can establish causation 
between their sex and wage determination.  Corning Glass is of limited 
application.  Presently, most employers do not intentionally pay women 
less than men.  Arguments that employers basing compensation decisions 
on factors such as prior salaries are engaging in intentional sex 
discrimination because those prior salaries reflect sex discrimination in the 
labor market have also failed under disparate treatment law, unless a 
plaintiff can offer  specific evidence that the previous employer engaged in 
discriminatory practices when setting wages.80 
 
 79. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(ii) (“If the respondent demonstrates that a 
specific employment practice does not cause the disparate impact, the respondent shall not 
be required to demonstrate that such practice is required by business necessity.”). 
 80. See Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Services, 427 F.3d 466, 470 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(“Wage patterns in some lines of work could be discriminatory, but this is something to be 
proved rather than assumed.  Wernsing has not offered expert evidence (or even a citation to 
the literature of labor economics) to support a contention that the establishments from which 
the Department recruits its employees use wage scales that violate the Equal Pay Act and 
thus discriminate against women.  If sex discrimination led to lower wages in the ‘feeder’ 
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Ambiguity of the market justification and obstacles in verifying its 
existence hinder the success of sex discrimination claims based on 
disparate treatment.  The sociological studies revealing salience of intra-
institutional structures and internal firm politics to wage determination 
could possibly aid prospective plaintiffs.  If the claim is that the employer 
is responsible for setting lower pay for women performing equal work as 
male co-workers and that this process is independent, or loosely dependent, 
on external market constraints, one can possibly meet the causation 
requirement that the employer is basing his decision on sex (and not the 
market).  But as empirical studies illustrate, providing the background 
information for such a factual claim is an onerous, time-consuming and 
expensive task.  In individual claims this may not be worth the cost.  In 
group-based claims, such as a class action, the investment in collecting 
information, hiring expert witnesses, and laying out the argument of 
intentional internal practices rather than market driven disparities may be 
an economically sensible decision. 
Plaintiffs could present social framework evidence81 to support their 
claim that underlying sex discrimination was a motivating factor in 
compensation decisions.  Such evidence was successfully utilized in high 
profile discrimination cases such as Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins82 and 
Dukes v. Walmart Inc.83  In social framework testimony an expert witness 
can explain how “general research results are used to construct a frame of 
reference or background context for deciding factual issues crucial to the 
resolution of a specific case.”84  In the context of employment 
discrimination litigation it usually is offered to “educate fact-finders about 
the conditions under which gender stereotypes and prejudices are likely to 
influence impressions, evaluations and behavior in social and organization 
settings.”85 
 
jobs, then using those wages as the base for pay at the Department would indeed perpetuate 
discrimination and violate the Equal Pay Act.”); Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co., 692 F.2d 
873, 876 (9th Cir. 1982) (presenting the same contention as Wernsing). 
 81. The use of social framework evidence in employment discrimination litigation has 
recently come under attack from the same scholars who introduced the term.  See John 
Monahan, Laurens Walker & Gregory Mitchell, Contextual Evidence of Gender 
Discrimination:  The Ascendance of “Social Frameworks,” 94 VA. L. REV. 1715 (2008); but 
see Melissa Hart and Paul Secunda, A Matter of Context:  Social Framework Evidence in 
Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 37 (2009) (presenting a 
warm endorsement of the practice). 
 82. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 83. Dukes v. Walmart Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d 509 F. 3d 1168 (9th 
Cir. 2007), review en banc granted, 2009 WL 365818 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2009). 
 84. Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks:  A New Use of Social 
Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 559 (1987). 
 85. Susan T. Fiske & Eugene Borgida, Providing Expert Knowledge in an Adversarial 
Context:  Social Cognitive Science in Employment Discrimination Cases, 4 ANN. REV. L. & 
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When using social framework testimony to explain how employers 
stereotype women according to gender roles, the argument is clear:  women 
are not expected to behave like men, and those that do are punished for this 
cross-gender behavior.86  This satisfies the causation requirement that the 
disparity in treatment was “because of sex.”  When we enter the domain of 
internal firm processes affecting terms and conditions of employment we 
are on less stable grounds.87  While the theory that the employer is partially 
insulated from external market forces is easy to articulate, providing 
evidence in specific cases that this amounts to sex based discrimination is 
more difficult. 
Take for example, Christensen v. Iowa,88 where an expert witness 
explained that the university was basing its compensation scheme on an 
unfounded perception that it could not hire physical plant workers at lower 
rates than it was currently paying.  Although this perception was based on 
the internal pressure this group of employees was exerting on management, 
this still does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it was paying them 
more because of their sex.  Perhaps it was just their organizational power, 
and the fact that they were men was incidental.  The expert testimony could 
only refute the employer’s offered explanation that external market forces 
warranted the higher wages for the male dominated occupation.  This does 
not amount to proving a causal link between sex and lower wages for 
women.89  Disparate treatment theory places the ultimate burden of 
 
SOC. SCI. 123, 128 (2008). 
 86. This notion was the crux of the expert testimony in the Price Waterhouse litigation.  
Susan Fiske, a renowned social psychologist, testified about how the plaintiff, Ann Hopkins, 
was denied partnership at an accounting firm due to gender stereotyping and the discomfort 
of her colleagues caused by her seemingly masculine behavior.  The court dismissed the 
employer’s objection to relying on testimony which applies general psychological research 
to the facts of the case:  “Indeed, we are tempted to say that Dr. Fiske's expert testimony 
was merely icing on Hopkins' cake.  It takes no special training to discern sex stereotyping 
in a description of an aggressive female employee as requiring ‘a course at charm school.’  
Nor, turning to Thomas Beyer's memorable advice to Hopkins, does it require expertise in 
psychology to know that, if an employee's flawed ‘interpersonal skills’ can be corrected by a 
soft-hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it is the employee's sex and not her 
interpersonal skills that has drawn the criticism.”  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
228, 256 (1989). 
 87. There is no exclusion of sociologists giving expert testimony, although the common 
practice is to hire cognitive and social psychologists.  Matthew Wise, From Price 
Waterhouse to Dukes and Beyond:  Bridging the Gap Between Law and Social Science By 
Improving the Admissibility Standard for Expert Testimony, 26 BERK. J. EMP. & LAB. L. 545, 
561 (2005). 
 88. 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977). 
 89. Nelson and Bridges are aware of the caveat:  “if the trial court had come to the same 
interpretation of the events as we offer, it does not necessarily follow that the plaintiffs 
would have prevailed.  The option of the court of appeals contains language that might treat 
the political effectiveness of various groups of workers as a valid basis for paying them 
different wages.”  Nelson & Bridges, supra note 57 at 167. 
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persuasion on the plaintiff.90  The fact that the plaintiff was able to discredit 
the external market defense with expert testimony does not mandate 
liability.91  The fact finder must also be convinced that sex was a 
motivating factor in the compensation decision.92  Not all internally-driven 
compensation schemes that result in lower wages for women performing 
the same work as men satisfy this condition. 
ii. Disparate Impact Law 
At first blush, disparate impact law seems an adequate means of 
handling the market defense.  Disparate impact law is all about identifying 
and then scrutinizing the business-relevancy of neutral employment 
practices that adversely impact a protected class.93  In theory, this is the 
vehicle to examine whether market-based practices are harming women, 
and if there is an adverse impact, to assess whether there is a legitimate 
management interest in continuing such a market-based practice.  However, 
disparate impact proves to be an unfaithful servant to wage equality 
because of doctrinal and practical issues. 
The first problem is that it is unclear whether disparate impact theory 
is available for plaintiffs claiming gender based pay discrimination.  The 
Bennett Amendment, a coordination clause between the EPA and Title VII, 
states that there will be no Title VII violation if the compensation 
differentiation is “authorized by the provision of section 206 (d) of title 
29”94 of the EPA.  There are two possible interpretations of the Bennett 
Amendment.  A broad interpretation would preclude a finding of violation 
in a case of gender based pay discrimination, unless the practice would 
have violated the Equal Pay Act as well, including the restrictive condition 
of “equal work.”  A narrower reading of the amendment would incorporate 
only the four affirmative defenses of the EPA95 
In Washington v. Gunther the Supreme Court opted for the narrow 
interpretation, enabling plaintiffs basing their wage discrimination claims 
 
 90. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (holding 
that employer bore no burden of persuasion that legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for 
the challenged employment action existed). 
 91. See St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) (holding that the trier of 
fact’s rejection of employer’s asserted legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its 
challenged actions does not entitle employee to judgment as a matter of law under the 
McDonnell Douglas scheme applicable to discriminatory treatment cases). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Andrew Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense to the Disparate 
Impact Cause of Action:  Finding the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1479 (1996). 
 94. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2000). 
 95. See Weiler, supra note 53, at 1734-35. 
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on Title VII to avoid proving the jobs compared involved “equal work.” 96  
But the Court did explain the amendment could have significant 
consequences for Title VII litigation, on account of the fourth affirmative 
defense to an EPA claim.  This defense states the employer can justify pay 
disparity resulting from “any other factor other than sex” (Hereinafter:  
“AFOTS defense”).  The court intimated but did not decide whether the 
AFOTS defense undermines Griggs-type disparate impact analysis under 
the EPA, and by the Bennett Amendment, under Title VII as well.97  The 
Court did not conclusively decide this issue in Gunther.98  On this judicial 
intimation several jurisdictions have interpreted the EPA and Title VII as 
restricting sex based compensation discrimination claims to disparate 
treatment type analysis.99  Other courts resisted, continuing to apply 
disparate impact analysis to both EPA and Title VII claims.100 
In Smith v. City of Jackson, an age discrimination case that looked into 
the applicability of disparate impact to the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (1967),101 the Supreme Court noted in a footnote:  “if 
Congress intended to prohibit all disparate impact claims, it could have 
certainly done so.102  For instance, in the Equal Pay Act, Congress barred 
recovery if pay differential was based “on any other factor”—reasonable or 
unreasonable—“other than sex.”103  Again, there is a strong suggestion, 
albeit in dictum, that the EPA’s fourth affirmative defense effectively rules 
out disparate impact.104 
 
 96. Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981). 
 97. Id. at 170-71. 
 98. The court addressed this issue in Gunther only to explain why a narrow reading of 
the Bennett Amendment would not necessarily render it superfluous.  Id. at 171 (“Although 
we do not decide in this case how sex-based wage discrimination litigation under Title VII 
should be structured to accommodate the fourth affirmative defense of the Equal Pay Act . . 
. we consider it clear that the Bennett Amendment, under this interpretation, is not rendered 
superfluous.”). 
 99. See generally cases discussed infra notes 127-131 and accompanying text. 
 100. See, e.g., EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 843 F.2d 249, 253 (6th Cir. 1988) (“In our 
circuit, however, the Bennett Amendment cannot constitute a blanket bar to all claims of 
wage discrimination based on disparate impact because the ‘factor other than sex’ defense 
does not include literally any other factor, but a factor that, at a minimum, was adopted for a 
legitimate business reason.”).  For a full discussion of the split among this circuits pertaining 
to the interpretation of the AFOTS defense, see Ruben Bolivar Pagan, Defending the 
"Acceptable Business Reason" Requirement of the Equal Pay Act:  A Response to the 
Challenges of Wernsing v. Department of Human Services, 33 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1007 
(2008). 
 101. 29 U.S.C.  § §621-633a (2000). 
 102. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005). 
 103. Id. at 239. 
 104. The suggestion in Gunther that disparate impact is not available under Title VII is 
misguided.  This suggestion would lead to an implausible situation where two similar claims 
of Title VII compensation discrimination, one claiming race or national origin base 
discrimination and the other claiming sex based discrimination, would not be offered the 
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For individual claimants, the disparate impact course of action may 
prove too expensive.  It is not sufficient to argue that to prove specific 
practices disparately impact women compared to men, the plaintiff has to 
offer statistical data supporting the claim which requires collecting data and 
hiring experts to conduct regression analysis.  Take, for example, the 
argument presented in section II.B that variance between the sexes in 
negotiation skills and styles can adversely impact the compensation of 
women.  General reference to the negotiation literature on this topic will 
not satisfy the requirement of statistical proof of disparate impact.105  Thus, 
a successful plaintiff will have to engage in at least a three step process to 
establish his prima facie case of disparate impact:  (1) identify the 
particular “market” practice they deemed discriminatory,106 (2) collect data 
from within the organization on how this practice affected the wages of 
individual employees, and (3) run the statistical regression analysis to show 
the required disparity between men and women.  It is highly unlikely that 
individuals will find it worthwhile to invest the resources to pursue such 
analysis. 
But even if we focus on class action cases, where investment in 
preparing a disparate impact claim may prove economically worthwhile, 
the theory will encounter doctrinal hurdles.  Statistical disparity resulting 
from application of a neutral employment practice establishes only a prima 
facie case of discrimination.  At this point the employer has the opportunity 
 
same scope of protection.  The sex based claim would be restricted to disparate treatment, 
while the race claim would resort to the disparate impact model as an alternative. 
 105. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (showing that 
general population comparisons discounted by the Court).  But see Dothard v. Rawlinson 
433 U.S. 321 (1977) (finding that disparate impact was proven by using general population 
data on how height and wage requirements disparately impact women in comparison to 
men).  The argument that negotiation practices adversely impact women more resembles the 
Beazer decision, which dealt with the adverse impact of denying employment to individuals 
who participated in methadone maintenance program on racial minorities.  In both cases 
there could be some variance between the impact of the practice on the defendant’s work 
force and the impact on the general population.  When dealing with height and weight 
requirements, using general population data may be appropriate because there is no reason 
to suspect that a specific workplace will display different patterns from the general 
population.  Many nuanced considerations are usually present when dealing with 
compensation determination.  The employer can rightly demand that the statistical 
regression analysis will be conducted on his actual workforce. 
 106. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, which codified disparate impact law, relieves the 
plaintiff of the requirement to isolate specific employment practices for the statistical 
analysis in cases where “the complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the 
elements of a respondent’s decision making process are not capable of separation for 
analysis” in which case “the decision making process may be analyzed as one employment 
practice.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2000).  But this exemption is usually irrelevant 
to the situation discussed in this Article, where the plaintiff targets a specific employment 
practice, such as reliance on prior salaries, matching counter offers, or individual 
negotiations, which can be separated from the bottom-line compensation decision. 
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to demonstrate that the challenged practice is “job related for the position 
in question and consistent with business necessity.”107  This is a relevancy 
test.  In other contexts of disparate impact law the business necessity 
defense has been interpreted quite broadly.108  Although cost-saving 
justifications have been rejected in the context of disparate treatment,109 
usually when an employer raises a cost-saving or profit-enhancing 
argument for his disparate impact practice, it will qualify as a “business 
necessity.”110  Structuring pay levels in a manner that takes into account 
employee individual wage expectations or demands may meet the applied 
standard of Title VII business necessity.  The business necessity defense is 
not restricted to productivity or ability arguments.  It is rather a loose-
reviewing mechanism, which engages in a balancing act between the 
interest of protected group members and the interest of the employer.111  
When it comes to profitability or labor cost saving claims, the scale is 
skewed toward the employer’s interest.112  Under this standard of review, 
 
 107. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)(2000). 
 108. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 701, 705-706 (2006) (concluding that “while it is true that the disparate impact theory 
allows proof of discrimination without the need to prove intent, employers are allowed to 
justify their practices under a business necessity test.  Because that test allows for normative 
judgments regarding what practices are properly defined as discriminatory, courts readily 
accept most proffered justifications.”); Spiropoulos, supra note 93 (The Supreme Court has 
implemented two standards of review for the business necessity defense.  When skill and 
jobs can be measured by scientific validation techniques the court is more willing to 
scrutinize the business justification of the employer.  But for jobs requiring special skills 
and other qualities that cannot be measures empirically the courts give more latitude to the 
employer’s discretion.). 
 109. See Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 717 (1978) 
(holding that challenged differential violated Title VII); see also Wilson v. Southwest 
Airlines Co, 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (presenting a similar rejection of a profit 
argument under the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) defense in a disparate 
treatment case). 
 110. Mark S. Brodin, Costs, Profits, And Equal Opportunity, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
318 (1987). 
 111. After the employer establishes a business necessity defense, the plaintiff can still 
resort to offering an alternative employment practice which achieves the same goal as the 
disparately impacting practice.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii)(2000).  Yet plaintiffs 
will find it hard to come up with alternative practices which are as cost effective. 
 112. See, e.g., EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 843 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1988) (detailing 
how an employer “head of household” benefit scheme was challenged under disparate 
impact law.  The employer covered only spouses of employees that earned more than half of 
the couple’s total income.  This program disparately impacted the coverage of women as 
compared to men.  Business necessity was established since the objective was to cover the 
neediest employees, at the lowest cost.  Taking cost into account was not governed by the 
Manhart decision since it did not intend to discriminate between the sexes.); Wambheim v. 
J.C. Penny Co. 705 F.2d 1492 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating the same contention); Christensen v. 
Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 356 (8th Cir. 1977) (willing to accept, under Title VII jurisprudence, an 
employer’s adherence to market pressure in setting wages:  “We find nothing in the text and 
history of Title VII suggesting that Congress intended to abrogate the laws of supply and 
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proponents of the market justifications can argue that negotiation 
techniques which may disparately impact women are lawful.113  If the 
techniques are aimed at promoting profitability by extracting more of the 
contractual surplus, they may meet the threshold of the business necessity 
standard. 
Ian Ayres offers the following guidelines for crafting the contours of 
“business necessity” with relation to the increasing profitability 
argument114: 
Policies that exploit a firm's market power to extract supra-
competitive profits from employees or consumers should not fall 
within the limits of the business necessity defense in disparate 
impact litigation.  Even though such policies can substantially 
enhance a firm's profitability, profits that are the byproduct of 
market failure are less justified than those that are a byproduct of 
competition.  By enjoining employment and consumer policies 
that extract supra-competitive profits disproportionately from 
racial minorities and other protected classes, disparate impact law 
can help make markets both more competitive and less racially 
discriminatory.115 
Ayres’s contribution is in noticing “not all increments to profitability 
deserve equal judicial respect.”116  He sketches this vignette: 
An employer pays high-school graduates an amount equal to their 
marginal productivity but institutes a new policy of paying non-
high school graduates less.  Imagine that the policy has a 
disparate impact against African Americans, who, in this 
hypothetical, are less likely to have a high school diploma.  The 
employer might justify the pay difference by arguing that non-
graduates tend to be less productive than high-school graduates.  
I will call this the productivity defense.  In the alternative, the 
employer might try to justify paying non-graduates less, not 
 
demand or other economic principles that determine wage rates for various kinds of work.  
We do not interpret Title VII as requiring an employer to ignore the market in setting wage 
rates for genuinely different work classifications.”). 
 113. The Supreme Court has stated that an employer’s decision to grant a larger raise to 
lower echelon employees for the purpose of bringing salaries in line with that of 
surrounding police forces was a decision based on a "reasonable factor other than age" in 
relation to an age discrimination disparate impact claim.  See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 
U.S. 228, 242 (2005).  Although Smith  is an age discrimination disparate impact case 
relating to the disparate impact of a raise policy on younger verses older employees, the 
rationale of granting deference to the employer’s business judgment about salary setting 
may be applicable to Title VII disparate impact wage discrimination jurisprudence. 
 114. Ian Ayres, Market Power and Inequality:  A Competitive Conduct Standard for 
Assessing When Disparate Impacts Are Unjustified, 95 CAL. L. REV. 669 (2007). 
 115. Id. at 669. 
 116. Id. at 672. 
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because the non-graduates are less productive, but solely because 
these employees have fewer employment alternatives than high-
school graduates.  For example, imagine that non-graduates were 
more tied to their hometown than graduates and hence had fewer 
work alternatives.  I will call this the market power defense, 
because the lower pay is a function of the employer's greater 
market power over the non-graduates.  Note that both of these 
defenses are, at core, about profitability.  The productivity 
defense in essence says that the policy enhances the firm's 
profitability because the employer will be more profitable if it is 
not forced to pay workers more than their marginal productivity.  
A firm that pays less productive workers the same as more 
productive workers will tend to be unprofitable.  But the market 
power defense is also about profitability, because finding a group 
of workers who will work for a sub-competitive wage is also an 
effective way for a firm to increase its profits.117 
From a normative policy perspective, Ayres may be right that the 
“business necessity” defense should be scrutinized more closely to 
ascertain what type of profitability argument the employer is promoting.  
When the employer is claiming the market enables him to extract a larger 
share of the contractual surplus from one group of employees than from 
another for the same work (in our case – extracting more from women on 
average than from men) this should fall outside the boundaries of a 
business necessity defense.  Regrettably, this approach has yet to be 
implemented in Title VII disparate impact litigation, where it is quite clear 
that profit-enhancement justifications are treated with deference.  
Nonetheless, as I discuss in section IV.D, Ayres’s distinctions are easier to 
implement in the EPA framework. 
A summary of my concerns about the prospects of disparate impact 
law to serve as a gatekeeper against employer market based justifications of 
gender pay disparity would go thus:  disparate impact law requires the 
analysis of statistical data to establish the correlation between specific 
employment practices and wage levels across gender lines.  The law 
requires the data be firm specific, necessitating both expertise and 
resources, which make such an analysis economically infeasible in many 
cases brought by individuals.  Even if the initial burden of demonstrating 
statistical disparate impact is met, courts often defer to employers’ 
explanations of business needs and profit maximizing behavior, which fall 
neatly within current interpretation of the business necessity defense.  
Lurking in the background are at least two remarks by the Supreme Court 
that disparate impact analysis is unavailable in gender wage discrimination 
cases. 
 
 117. Id. at 672-73. 
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IV. THE PARTIAL CAUSATION MODEL FOR WAGE DISCRIMINATION 
CLAIMS 
A. Initial Justification for a Partial Causation Model 
Embedded in Title VII theory of discrimination is a causal link 
between group membership and adverse treatment of group members.118  
This concept of discrimination impedes the ability to combat discrimination 
when such causation is unverifiable or too complex.  Ascertaining which 
factors contribute to disparity in compensation between two similarly 
situated employees is one such case.  Absent direct evidence that the 
employer intentionally took gender into consideration when setting wages 
(the Corning Glass scenario), and especially if the employer insists that 
market constraints or opportunities warranted paying one employee who 
happened to be male more than his female colleague, the causation model 
is of limited use.  In theory, resorting to disparate impact analysis, we can 
go about weeding out which factors correlate with gender and thus meet the 
causation requirement, but in practice, this is usually impossible. 
Sex discrimination is treating people differently on the basis of their 
gender.  The causation model opts to prove discrimination by requiring the 
plaintiff to present evidence of causation – how the prohibited factor (sex) 
directly or indirectly affected the decision.  The model emphasizes the need 
to show how the irrelevant factor, gender, found its way into the decision-
making process. 
Another way to define gender discrimination is by focusing on 
whether the employer has used relevant factors in setting pay.  The 
policymaker identifies the range of pertinent factors for determining 
compensation.  Any wage disparity between men and women that cannot 
be explained by one or more of these legitimate factors is deemed as a 
matter of law a manifestation of gender discrimination.  One way to legally 
formulate this concept of discrimination is to institute an irrebuttable 
presumption of discrimination when an employer cannot offer an 
explanation that meets one of those authorized reasons.  Any other basis for 
the disparity, if not on the list of qualified explanations, is rejected and the 
fact finder must conclude that sex discrimination has tainted the decision-
making process.  The difference between the two frameworks can be 
articulated as follows:  the traditional model is formulated as a negative 
command “sex is an irrelevant factor”.  It permits broad discretion; 
allowing the decision maker to base his decision on infinite grounds, 
restricted only by gender based decisions.  The proposed model is 
 
 118. Kelman, supra note 75. 
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structured around a positive command “you can base your decision only on 
an authorized list of factors”. 
Application of the market defense to these two frameworks can 
exemplify their divergence.  In the traditional framework the market 
argument aims to show that the employer based his decision on some factor 
other than sex.  The relevance of that other factor is not closely scrutinized.  
Under the proposed model, the market explanation must be examined to 
see whether it falls within the scope of the relevant factors.  The defense 
will only be established if it is determined that the specifics of the market 
justification are in fact relevant to wage determination.  Under this regime 
the ability to justify wage disparities with market based arguments is 
bounded by a relevancy test. 
The traditional model of defining discrimination by irrelevant factors 
has at least three strong justifications.  First, it safeguards the actor’s 
freedom.  Restrictions are placed on the employer only in the prohibited 
zone; any other motivations, frivolous or irrational, are not subject to 
review.  Second, it is assumed that it is an easier task to identify what are 
the wrong reasons to reach a certain decision, than to compile a complete 
list of the “good reasons.”  The risk of making an error is higher when we 
are required to compile a conclusive list of relevant inputs than when we 
are only committed to make sure that the factors on our “bad list” are 
indeed irrelevant and socially harmful.  The possibility that there are 
additional unidentified harmful motives does not derogate the task, since 
the focus is on particular wrongs – making sure that those already 
identified are regulated.  Later the list of irrelevant factors can be 
expanded, as was the experience with employment anti-discrimination 
mandates, expanding its reach from the initial five core categories of race, 
color, religion, sex, and national origin to issues such as age based 
discrimination, disability and pregnancy.  Lastly, if our objective is to 
combat discrimination, especially discrimination based on group 
membership, the negative definition framework seems to provide a natural 
fit.  It accomplishes what it set out to do:  weeding out only practices or 
decisions that are based on group membership.  On the other hand, 
following the relevant factor list may result in interfering with decisions 
that are not motivated or affected by group membership considerations. 
The relevant-factor definition of discrimination has its advantages too.  
Assuming we want to control only decisions based on group membership, 
turning to this definition may advance this goal.  When the decision-
making process is complex and based on multiple factors, or subjective 
decentralized evaluations, filtering it through a comprehensive checklist of 
authorized factors may prove beneficial.119  The traditional model raises the 
 
 119. This proposal stems from a similar understanding of the complexity of workplace 
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question whether group membership played a role in the decision-making, 
but the answer in many cases is usually inconclusive.  We don’t know, and 
therefore our understanding is that the plaintiff’s burden of persuasion has 
not been met.  The law has developed evidentiary presumptions and tools 
to aid a plaintiff in meeting his causation burden.  Both disparate treatment 
law and disparate impact law have moved in this direction.120  But at the 
end of the day, as the market defense has proven all too well, the causation 
requirement effectively precludes liability in these complex multi-
component cases, enabling employers to evade liability in some cases 
where causation to group membership is present, but cannot be isolated and 
verified among the myriad factors contributing to the decision.  On the 
other hand, the relevant-factors approach keeps things simple.  Once the 
decision maker fails to show that he was guided by the authorizing factors, 
he is liable.  Liability attaches even in cases when he can point to other 
factors, not on the list, which have no known statistical correlation with 
membership in the protected group. 
 Applying the traditional model will result in false negatives.  Some 
decisions are sanctioned, although they are based on group membership, in 
the disparate treatment or disparate impact sense.  Causation may exist in 
fact but not be detected due to information and verification problems or the 
complexity of the causal link between some factors known to affect the 
decision and membership in the protected group.  Turning to the positive 
definition model will lead to false positives.  Some decisions will be 
deemed discriminatory, since the decision-maker relied on factors not on 
 
decision-making that is driving a growing number of scholars to recommend that employers 
adopt structured processes and protocols to self regulate their compliance with Title VII.  
See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination:  A Structural 
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001) (proposing a structural regulatory solution to 
second generation employment discrimination); Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in 
Workplace Dynamics:  Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 
HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 91 (2003); Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace 
in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 366-372 (2005).  The structural 
approach is an attempt to improve compliance with anti-discrimination mandates in 
situations we fear that the employer is perhaps engaging in unconscious bias and 
discrimination.  Instituting self evaluation and prophylactic measures is presumed to 
decrease the risk of the employer unconsciously and unintentionally reaching unlawful 
discriminatory decisions.  The difference between my proposal and the structural approach 
is that the latter builds on establishing process and procedures to de-bias the institution from 
its unconscious discriminatory practices.  Yet the structural approach is still focused on 
causation.  Process is established to make sure, as a prophylactic measure, that prohibited 
considerations are not part of the decision-making process. 
 120. In disparate treatment law, the landmark decision of McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792 (1973), established the four prong prima facie case (PFC) for an individual 
disparate treatment case and articulated the burden of production the employer carries to 
answer the PFC.  In disparate impact, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified the various 
stages and burden of persuasion shifting, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000). 
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the affirmative list, but these factors have no underlying causal links to 
membership in the protected group.121  Given that both models have their 
costs, the question is which model is ultimately more beneficial. 
As a starting point, one should always turn to the traditional model.  
But in cases where there is growing confirmation of its failure to identify 
discrimination, serious consideration should be given to switching to the 
relevant-factors model.  In other words, if there is suspicion that too many 
false negatives are occurring, the traditional model is ineffective in 
achieving its goal of eliminating group-based discrimination.  The second 
qualification for considering the relevant-factors model is the confidence 
that a policymaker has in its ability to identify many pertinent factors.  If 
the affirmative list is comprised of the majority of appropriate grounds, this 
decreases the chance that there will be false positive determinations of 
discrimination. 
The endeavor to eliminate the gender wage gap is an area of 
discrimination law where we should start questioning the effectiveness of 
the traditional model.  The gender wage gap remains a persistent barrier to 
sex equality in the workplace.  The average earnings of women working 
full time is still around twenty percent less than the average earnings of 
men holding a full time job.122  The wage gap has not diminished in any 
meaningful way in the past decade.123  Section II outlined circumstances 
where the causation model failed to identify gender-based compensation 
schemes.  The failure was not due to a lack of understanding of how to 
apply the causation model.  The failure was imminent due to the structural 
constraints of the traditional framework.  Given the complexity of how 
gender and sex correlate with other social factors such as negotiation skills, 
mobility, career expectations, social norms, and various other issues we 
 
 121. One such false positive case is when the disparity in compensation is due to changes 
over time in the demand or supply of employees in an industry, profession, or geographical 
area as was the case in Ciardella v. Carson City School District, 671 F. Supp. 699 (D. Nev. 
1987) (showing that due to economic changes in the job market, the employer was required 
to extend an offer of compensation of approximately $10,000 more per year than the 
plaintiff was receiving while performing the same job).  In these situations, there is no 
underlying, unidentified statistical correlation between the temporal market conditions and 
the sex of the workers hired at the different points in time.  But since market conditions are 
not listed on the affirmative list, an employer maybe found liable.  In these situations, the 
positive definitions of discrimination entail costs. 
 122. In the first quarter of 2009, women who worked full time had median earnings of 
$649 per week, or 78.9 percent of the $823 median for men.  U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU 
OF LABOR STATISTICS, USDL 09-1242, Usual Weekly Earnings of Wage and Salary 
Workers: First Quarter 2009 (2009), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/wkyeng.pdf. 
 123. In 1998, women earned about 76 percent as much as men.  The median weekly 
earnings of female fulltime wage and salary workers were $456 compared to $598 for men.  
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, REPORT 928, Highlights of Women’s 
Earnings in 1998, available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpswom98.pdf. 
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have not even begun to think about, the causation model lets too many of 
these factors escape meaningful review.  The result is too many false 
negatives, errors that keep feeding the gender wage gap. 
Implementing the relevant-factors model cannot solely be based on a 
high rate of false negatives.  Equally important is the consideration of 
whether policymakers are capable of ascertaining the appropriate factors.  
This is an essential prerequisite, needed to ensure that unnecessary or 
unfair restrictions are not placed on the decision maker’s discretion.  
Compensation determinations meet this perquisite.  We can ascertain that 
compensation should somehow correlate with the job or task being 
preformed and individual productivity.  We can state that employees 
performing the same job, under similar conditions, with equal productivity 
should be compensated similarly.  How we classify the “sameness” of jobs 
or working conditions and how to exactly measure productivity is 
debatable.  But this is an issue where we have an initial agreement of what 
are the relevant factors.124 
B. Is The Equal Pay Act a Partial Causation Model? 
The Equal Pay Act consists of two parts.  The first part, the prima 
facie case (PFC), sets out the criteria for determining which jobs are 
deemed equal and warrant equal pay to employees of opposite genders.  
The PFC elements are that an employer pays:  (1) different wages (2) 
within the same establishment (3) to employees of opposing sexes (4) for 
equal work on jobs that require equal skill, effort, and responsibility and 
which are preformed under similar working conditions.  The second part of 
the EPA lists the four affirmative defenses:  (i) a seniority system; (ii) a 
merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or 
production, or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.  
Once the plaintiff establishes her PFC, the burden of persuasion shifts to 
the defendant employer to show the disparity is caused by one of the four 
affirmative defenses.125 
The PFC’s fourth element focuses on general attributes of the jobs 
compared, making sure that the positions are “equal,” in essence, requiring 
 
 124. Guaranteeing reduction in false positive rates requires restrictive definitions of what 
qualifies as equal work and what qualifies as equal productivity. 
 125. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196-97 (1974) (“[W]hile the Act is 
silent on this question, its structure and history also suggest that once the Secretary has 
carried his burden of showing that the employer pays workers of one sex more than workers 
of the opposite sex for equal work, the burden shifts to the employer to show that the 
differential is justified under one of the Act's four exceptions.  All of the many lower courts 
that have considered this question have so held, and this view is consistent with the general 
rule that the application of an exemption under the Fair Labor Standards Act is a matter of 
affirmative defense on which the employer has the burden of proof.”). 
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equal skill effort and responsibility and performed under similar working 
conditions.  It is the plaintiff’s burden to present the case for this general 
equivalence.  The affirmative defense shifts the focus to individual 
differences between two or more people performing “equal work.”  
Basically what the employer is arguing, when raising one of the four 
affirmative defenses, is that although the plaintiff and the comparator (the 
individual whom the plaintiff is comparing herself to) are performing the 
same job, they are not entitled to equal compensation due to differences in 
their individual performance or work history.  Seniority, merit, and quantity 
based earnings all relate to individual attributes of specific individuals. 
The PFC of the EPA certainly deviates from the causation model.  A 
plaintiff neither has to show that the employer took into account her sex 
when determining compensation, nor does she have to demonstrate the 
disparate impact of the employer’s practice on women as a group.  The 
omission of causation in the PFC makes the EPA accessible to individual 
employees.  One does not need extraordinary resources to argue, “I am 
performing the same job, in the same establishment, but being paid less 
than comparable men.”  The plaintiff does not have to offer any theory or 
evidence of causation between her sex and her lower compensation.  She 
just has to present factual evidence that she is being paid less than a male 
co-worker performing the same job.  The PFC stage relies on a relevancy 
test only.  It takes pain to detail the relevant factors such as working in the 
same establishment, equal work, equal skill, effort and responsibility, and 
work under the same working conditions.  All these factors are related to 
productivity.  Making sure that the plaintiff and the comparator are 
performing jobs that have the potential of generating the same productivity 
is central in modeling employer decision-making. 
The affirmative defense stage turns to the issue of individual 
productivity.  If the plaintiff is successful in meeting her burden of 
persuasion to show the jobs are potentially equal (can generate the same 
output from the employer’s perspective), the employer can argue that pay 
differentials are due to individual variations in the performance of the 
plaintiff and the comparator.  The three specific affirmative defenses 
authorize pay systems based on seniority, merit, or production.  All three 
reference factors that proxy individual productivity.  It is assumed that 
more experience (seniority), more training or credentials (merit), and 
contributing more production (production) enhance an individual’s 
productivity.  These three defenses fall squarely in the relevancy model, 
encompassing factors that are relevant to pay variations. 
The fourth defense, “any other factor other than sex” (AFOTS), poses 
a serious challenge to my argument that the EPA is a partial causation 
model of discrimination.  The AFOTS defense uses language associated 
with the causation model.  “Any other factor other than sex,” sounds 
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equivalent to a mandate prohibiting only decisions that are driven by sex-
based motivations.  It suggests that any non-sex based factor is an 
acceptable justification for gender wage disparity.  I think that normatively 
(if not linguistically), this is a wrong reading of the AFOTS defense.  If any 
factor other than sex could justify pay disparity, this would make the three 
specific defenses redundant.  Why mention merit, seniority, or individual 
production if all three fall in the catchall exemption of “any other factor?”  
A better interpretation of AFOTS is that the catchall exemption references 
only to explanations that correlate with productivity, as long as they are not 
tainted by intentional sex discrimination.  If AFOTS is interpreted in this 
limited fashion, the EPA is an application of the partial causation model of 
discrimination.  It does not require the plaintiff to demonstrate causation 
between her sex and lower compensation, and it does not relieve an 
employer of liability by severing causation between sex and compensation.  
Looking at the mandate as a whole, it can be summarized as requiring the 
employer to provide productive workers of opposite sex, who are 
performing the same job, with equal pay.  Whenever an employer deviates 
from this mandate he is deemed discriminatory, even if there is no 
indication that he was motivated by sex based considerations or that the 
factors he relied on adversely impact women as a group. 
C.   Why Was The Equal Pay Act Interpreted as a Causation Model? 
EPA jurisprudence has not indicated any willingness to deviate from 
the traditional understanding of what constitutes sex discrimination and the 
centrality of the causation model.  This can be displayed by the treatment 
of the market defense.  A conflict among the Circuits exists with regards to 
the proper contours of the catchall affirmative defense, “any factor other 
than sex” (AFOTS).  The Supreme Court has resisted settling this 
conflict.126 
In the conservative camp, the Eighth Circuit led the way in Strecker v. 
Grand Forks County Social Service Board,127 holding that any 
determination by an employer that he established a neutral pay system 
qualifies as “any other factor other than sex.”128  The Seventh Circuit 
followed suit in Wernsing v. Department of Human Services,129 where a 
female employee challenged the practice of basing compensation on 
 
 126. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Aldrich, 506 U.S. 965 (1992). 
 127. 640 F.2d 96 (8th Cir. 1980). 
 128. Another 8th Circuit decision affirming the Strecker’s standard is Taylor v. White, 
321 F.3d 710, 719 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[w]e ‘do not sit as a super-personnel department that re-
examines an entity's business decisions . . . .’  As such we are reluctant to establish a per se 
rule that might chill the legitimate use of gender-neutral policies and practices.”). 
 129. 427 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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previous salaries of lateral hiring because it resulted in substantially 
different pay for male and female employees.  The Seventh Circuit stated 
that the EPA only “asks whether the employer has a reason other than sex--
not whether it has a ’good’ reason.”130 
The broad interpretation of the AFOTS defense transforms the EPA 
into a disparate treatment only model of discrimination (not allowing 
consideration of disparate impact).131  Since the employer can justify his 
pay decisions by any non-sex factor, endeavors like those of the plaintiff in 
Wernsing to show how the challenged practice affected women’s 
compensation are futile.  The EPA under this interpretation regulates only 
intentional sex based compensation decisions.  The Eight and Seventh 
Circuits' reading of the EPA, especially the AFOTS defense, leaves no 
doubt that they did not acknowledge any innovative understanding of what 
are unlawful wage practices.  This understanding is grounded deep within 
the causation model, limited to conventional intentional disparate 
treatment. 
Other Circuits are more open-minded about scrutinizing employers’ 
market based explanation for wage disparity.  Probably the most cited 
example is the Ninth Circuit decision in Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co.132  
In that case, the plaintiff argued that her employer’s practice of using prior 
salaries to determine compensation was discriminatory because it resulted 
in the average female sales agent being paid less than her average male 
counterpart.  When considering possible interpretations to the AFOTS 
defense, the court rejected the two extreme options:  one that would enable 
the employer to evade liability by showing he relied on any factor other 
than the employee’s sex.  This interpretation was dismissed since 
employers can manipulate factors having close correlation to gender.133  
The second interpretation rejected is one that would deny employers the 
opportunity to use acceptable factors, if it perpetuates historic sex 
discrimination.134  Instead the court required that the employer show that 
the pay system was based on an "acceptable business reason."135  The Sixth 
Circuit also incorporated the "acceptable business reason" limitation into 
the AFOTS defense.  In EEOC v. J.C Penney Co., it reasoned, “The ‘factor 
 
 130. Id. at 468. 
 131. Id. at 469  (“An analogy to disparate-impact litigation under Title VII does not 
justify a ‘business reason’ requirement under the Equal Pay Act, however, because the 
Equal Pay Act deals exclusively with disparate treatment.  It does not have a disparate-
impact component.”). 
 132. 692 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 133. Id. at 876. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at n.6 (declining to articulate what falls within the standard of “acceptable 
business reason” leaving the compiling of a list of unacceptable reasons or a more concise 
formulation of the standard to “another day”.). 
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other than sex’ defense does not include literally any other factor, but a 
factor that at a minimum, was adopted for a legitimate business reason.” 136  
The Eleventh Circuit followed suit in Glenn v. General Motors Corp. 
adopting the reasonable business reason standard when reviewing the 
employer’s explanation that to encourage people to move out of hourly 
wage jobs into salaried tracks, it established a policy against requiring an 
employee to take a cut in pay, and that this policy, and not the sex of the 
employees, was the cause of the pay disparity between men and women.137  
Rejecting this explanation the court stated that “[t]he legislative history 
thus indicates that the ‘factor other than sex’ exception applies when the 
disparity results from unique characteristics of the same job; from an 
individual's experience, training, or ability; or from special exigent 
circumstances connected with the business.  The pay disparity at issue here 
does not result from any of these reasons.”138  Finally, the Second Circuit in 
Aldrich v. Central School District, asserted that “we believe that Congress 
specifically rejected blanket assertions of facially-neutral job classification 
systems as valid factor-other-than-sex defenses to EPA claims.” 139  It 
required the employer to prove that a bona fide business-related reason 
exists for the gender neutral factor that resulted in wage differentials.140 
The “acceptable business reason” limitation of the AFOTS defense 
does not convert the EPA into a partial causation model of sex 
discrimination.  The line of decisions which require the employer to offer 
an acceptable business reason for his pay practices simply incorporate a 
variance of disparate impact into the EPA,141 in contrast to the more 
conservative circuits which permit only disparate treatment type claims.  In 
essence, what the courts are saying is that in cases where the plaintiff meets 
her PFC, we require the employer to explain why his pay scheme, which 
resulted in the plaintiff being paid less than her male co-workers for equal 
work, is sound from a business perspective.  In spirit, this is analogous to 
the “business necessity” defense.  The “acceptable business reason” 
standard leaves employers with more latitude than the “business necessity” 
standard, which is constrained by the accumulative requirements of 
 
 136. EEOC v. J.C Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249, 253 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 137. 841 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 138. Id. at 1571. 
 139. 963 F.2d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 140. Id. at 526. 
 141. This is also how the Wernsing court characterizes the Kouba standard.  “Kouba, 
which originated the ‘acceptable business reason’ requirement, did not explain its genesis; it 
was advanced as ukase.  The ninth circuit proceeded as if the Equal Pay Act worked like the 
disparate-impact theory under Title VII:  if the plaintiff shows that an employment practice 
adversely affects protected workers as a group, then the employer must provide a strong 
reason (‘business necessity’) for the practice.”  Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 
F.3d 466, 469 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). 
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showing both job relatedness to the position in question and business 
necessity.  It is hard to envision the “acceptable business reason” standard 
as invigorating a relevancy-based model of discrimination because it 
requires only cursory review of the business soundness of pay practices 
resulting in lower wages for women workers, without further guidance that 
these justifications must relate only to productivity concerns. 
Why are the courts resisting the partial causation model?  First and 
foremost, any relevancy-based theory of discrimination is antithetical to the 
historical and cultural basis of employment discrimination law in the 
United States.  If jurists, litigators, and judges are educated and trained to 
conceptualize discrimination only as basing decisions on prohibited factors 
such as race or sex, it is extremely difficult to make the mental leap to the 
relevancy definition, which asks whether the decision was based only on 
relevant factors.  It is inevitable that with this indoctrination the disposition 
is to construct the EPA as a traditional anti-discrimination mandate.  But 
there are also at least three linguistic foundations within the language of 
both the EPA and Title VII that may have contributed to this interpretation. 
First, whether you apply a broad or narrow interpretation, the AFOTS 
defense uses language associated with the causation model.  It suggests that 
any non-sex-based factor is an acceptable justification for gender wage 
disparity.  This linguistic reading certainly influenced the Seventh and 
Eight Circuits’ understanding of AFOTS defense.  The Bennett 
Amendment also contributes to the application of the causation model 
within the EPA.  Although merely a coordination clause, which the 
objective was to clarify that employment practices authorized by the EPA 
shall not be considered a violation of Title VII, the Bennett Amendment 
was implicitly comprehended as bridging the gap between the two statutes, 
and partially unifying them to one body of law with respect to sex-based 
compensation discrimination.142  If the two statutes are interrelated, then 
one theory of discrimination, the causation model, should govern them 
both.  This conclusion is not warranted by the Bennett Amendment.  It is a 
one-way coordination clause, restricting only Title VII by the EPA and not 
vice versa.  Actually, if the premise is that the EPA and Title VII are 
virtually the same, there would be no need for a coordination clause.  It is 
only when we recognize existing differences between the theory and 
elements of liability that a coordination mechanism is meaningful.  The last 
linguistic hint of a causation model is the opening proviso of the EPA:  “No 
employer . . . shall discriminate . . . on the basis of sex.”143  This language 
could also be understood as embracing the Title VII causation model.  The 
 
 142. The court acknowledged that there are variations between the two statutes in the 
prima facie case and the scope of the employer’s defense, but they do not consider these 
differences to be foundational.  Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981). 
 143. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006). 
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proviso, however, should not be interpreted as an endorsement of the 
causation model.  The following sentence, the substantive part of the EPA, 
immediately explains what it means in the context of the EPA to 
discriminate in terms of pay on the basis of sex, resorting to the relevancy 
model.  The proviso is simply a term that is followed by its definition. 
Normative considerations are also important.  Parting from the 
causation model in favor of a relevancy test carries with it hefty limitations 
on managerial discretion in setting individual wage rates.  It is feared that it 
will result in the elimination of differential pay altogether, as employers 
will constantly worry about employees coming forward with claims of pay 
inequality.  Under a relevancy test, the burden to justify the pay scheme is 
substantially heavier than under the irrelevancy test, where you simply 
have to convince the fact-finder that sex considerations did not taint your 
decision-making process.  The conflict among the circuit courts about the 
proper interpretation of the AFOTS defense can be explained by the 
discrepancy among the circuits regarding the latitude employers should 
have in constructing their pay schemes.  The conservative camp shields 
employers from any intervention with managerial discretion beyond 
intentionally sex-based decisions, while Kouba and its progeny place some 
restrictions on employers, but only on the outskirts.144  Shifting to a partial 
causation model takes a significant step forward in regulatory intervention, 
since any justification is screened against strict productivity-enhancing 
criteria.  It should be clear that even under the strict standard, there is still 
ample room for individual differentiation (based on productivity 
considerations). 
D. Can the Partial Causation Model be Resurrected within the Equal Pay 
Act? 
Absent legislative amendments clarifying the structure of the EPA by 
highlighting the foundational differences from Title VII jurisprudence, it is 
unlikely the relevancy-based model of discrimination will be implemented.  
As illustrated, all of the federal circuits that have interpreted the EPA 
AFOTS defense share an implicit understanding that causation is the core 
issue of liability.  Nonetheless, I think that one can build on the existing 
“acceptable business reason” advanced in Kouba and its progeny to 
emulate a paradigm that operates fairly similarly to the relevancy test.  
Although the theoretical foundation will be lacking, the end result would be 
satisfactory. 
The “acceptable business reason” is a standard of review that 
 
 144. These decisions only accomplish in broadening the EPA to include disparate impact 
type claims.  See supra notes 132-140 and accompanying text. 
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scrutinizes the employer’s explanation for wage disparities.  It currently 
provides employers considerable leeway, only ensuring that the employer’s 
explanation is not hiding traditional sex discrimination.  A similar outcome 
to fully implementing a relevancy test can be achieved by heightening 
scrutiny on employers, and requiring them to detail and substantiate their 
claims with facts and data supporting their contention that productivity 
enhancement is the underlying basis for the pay disparity. 
Here, we can draw on Ayres’ proposal to distinguish between general 
profitability claims and specific claims pertaining to productivity.145  I have 
questioned the prospect of applying this important insight to Title VII’s 
“business necessity” defense, but I am more optimistic of implementing it 
through the EPA AFOTS defense.  Title VII is more of a market-driven 
statute than the EPA.  The EPA is incorporated into the Fair Labor 
Standard Act of 1938 (“FLSA”).146  The central purpose of the FLSA is to 
secure minimum wage and overtime pay to covered employees, and to 
place restrictions on child labor.147  These provisions are all anti-market 
measures.  Regulations on minimum wage, overtime, and child labor all 
spur from an ideology that sometimes market outcomes are either 
inefficient or inequitable, even if they enhance profitability.  The FLSA is 
about regulating market pressures, and the quest of employers to extract 
profits.  In this statutory environment it is easier to explain why not all 
profit-maximizing behavior should be authorized.  It is thus feasible to 
apply Ayres’ distinction between profits sustained through depressing 
wages of one group of employee, which is not a valid “acceptable business 
reason,” and profits gained through applying a policy that increases 
productivity, which is acceptable.148 
In summary, the EPA can be salvaged.  Meeting the PFC will require 
the employer to provide a productivity rationale for his general 
compensation system or for specific productivity variance between the 
plaintiff and her comparator.  The failure to offer productivity related 
rationales will give rise, as a matter of law, to an irrebuttable presumption 
that the disparity is “because of sex.”  This framework preserves the 
causation model as the theoretical foundation of the EPA, but for all 
practical matters relieves the plaintiff of the need to point to causation 
either through disparate treatment or disparate impact analysis.  Under this 
proposal, carrying the burden of the EPA prima facie case will establish a 




 145. Ayres, supra note 114. 
 146. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Ayres, Market Power and Inequality, supra note 114. 
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E.  The Paycheck Fairness Act 
The best prospect for implementing a partial causation model within 
the EPA is the Paycheck Fairness Act.149  The bill is an amendment to the 
EPA, and is currently pending in the Senate after passing in the House of 
Representatives.  Section 3 revises the AFOTS defense by limiting its 
application only to differentials based on “a bona fide factor other than sex, 
such as education, training, or experience.”150  The bona fide factor defense 
applies only if the employer demonstrates that such a factor:  (i) is not 
based upon or derived from a sex-based differential in compensation; (ii) is 
job-related with respect to the position in question; and (iii) is consistent 
with business necessity.151  The defense does not apply where the employee 
demonstrates that:  (1) an alternative employment practice exists that would 
serve the same business purpose without producing such differential; and 
(2) the employer has refused to adopt such alternative practice.152 
The Paycheck Fairness Act includes other important provisions such 
as expanded retaliation protection that covers inquiries and disclosure of 
information about wages;153 strengthened remedies, including 
compensatory and punitive damages;154 requiring the EEOC to provide 
training on issues pertaining  wage discrimination;155 and authorizing the 
Secretary of Labor to make grants to programs providing negotiation skills 
training for girls and women, and to conduct studies and provide 
information regarding the means available to eliminate pay disparities 
between men and women.156 
This bill addresses many of the barriers to gender pay equality 
discussed in this Article, including the significant impact of lack of 
information and negotiation skills on the wages of women.  The new 
catchall exception is substantially narrower.  First, it applies only to a bona 
fide factor.157  Second, examples follow the general principle listing 
education, training, and experience, all issues relevant to productivity.  
There is no mention of any market justifications or sheer profit 
 
 149. Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 12, 111th Cong. (2009), available at 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-12. 
 150. Id. at § 3(a)(2). 
 151. Id. at § 3(a)(3). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at § 3(b). 
 154. Id. at § 3(c). 
 155. Id. at § 4. 
 156. Id. at §§ 5, 6, and 9. 
 157. The bona fide requirement was implicitly incorporated in the existing interpretation 
of the AFOTS.  None of the circuits interpreting the AFOTS defense alluded to the 
possibility that they will not review a claim that the defense served as a subterfuge for 
intentional discrimination. 
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maximization arguments.  Third, any defense would be scrutinized under 
the equivalent of the Title VII “business necessity” standard.158  One should 
note that the “business necessity” standard is applicable only to 
productivity justifications-– those factors that are listed as examples of the 
AFOTS, such as education, training, and experience.  This would bar all 
non-productivity factors, and subject productivity-related factors to the 
additional scrutiny of the “business necessity” standard.159 
Although the proposal incorporates Title VII “business necessity” 
language, it is not a revival of disparate impact theory within the EPA.  The 
bill does not require the plaintiff to offer evidence that the scrutinized 
factor disparately impacts women, nor does it limit its application to any 
factor.  The adoption of the “business necessity” standard is limited in 
scope.  Only justifications such as those listed as examples of legitimate 
factors are subject to “business necessity” scrutiny.  All other explanations, 
including market-based justifications are dismissed a priori, without 
“business necessity” scrutiny.  The structure of the amended AFOTS 
defense is a true manifestation of a partial causation model of 
discrimination.  It takes pain in explaining what counts as a legitimate 
factor to make compensation decisions:  a productivity-related explanation 
that fulfills the business necessity requirement.  The bill implicitly states 
that, as a matter of law, sex discrimination is established when gender pay 
disparities are the outcome of utilizing a criteria not authorized by the 
statute. 
V. CONCLUSION 
When discussing my ideas about pay equality with colleagues and 
friends, I am usually confronted by one of three reactions.  The skeptical 
want to know how it is possible that an employer can pay two equally 
productive workers different wages.  They think that the disparate pay is 
the ultimate proof that these two workers are not equally productive.  If 
indeed they are equally productive,  a profit-maximizing employer should 
opt for hiring only employees willing to work for the lower wages, leading 
to a new equilibrium where again all workers with equal productivity are 
compensated at the same wage rate.  The skeptical also make the argument 
 
 158. The Act uses almost identical language to the definition of “business necessity” 
defense of Title VII.  Compare id. with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006). 
 159. Section 3(a)(3)(B) of the bill states that “[t]he bona fide factor defense described in 
subparagraph A (iv) [the AFOTS] shall apply only if the employer demonstrates” business 
necessity.  Paycheck Fairness Act, supra note 131, at § 3(a)(3)(B).  I read this to mean that 
the employer has to meet two accumulative conditions.  First, he has to identify the bona 
fide factor other than sex, which is limited only to productivity issues such as education, 
training, and experience.  In addition, he has to demonstrate that these factors meet the 
“business necessity standard” of Title VII.  This is a very strict standard. 
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that negotiation skills are relevant vocational abilities, which enhance the 
performance of employees.  The libertarians are worried about managerial 
discretion and the ability under my thesis to actually implement deferential 
pay based on individual merit and productivity.  They fear employers will 
react by instituting rigid pay schedules, similar to the ones in the unionized 
sector.  These pay schemes will undermine productivity because they will 
curtail any individual incentive to excel and work hard.  The enthusiasts 
want more; they inquire where else can the model of partial causation be 
applied?  They support the idea of relevancy checklists to combat 
discrimination. 
The response to the skeptical is threefold.  The formal answer is that 
the partial causation model does not have any qualms with employers that 
argue that the plaintiff and the comparator are not equally productive.  This 
is precisely what the model wants the employer to come forward and say.  
The model applies only if the employer insists on raising non-productivity 
claims, implicitly conceding that in terms of productivity, the workers are 
equal.  For example, an employer can justify pay disparity if he argues that 
negotiation skills are a good proxy for future performance on the job.  This 
may be true in specific professions and positions, but not across the board.  
This transforms the market argument into an ability criterion which is 
legitimate if the employer successfully presents evidence of a productivity 
enhancing attribute.160  But it is not good enough for the employer to only 
justify the disparity by arguing he was not forced by market constraints to 
raise the wage of the female employee. 
Why do employers keep hiring the higher paid individuals when they 
can hire equally productive employees for lower wages?  In some 
industries and occupations, this is exactly what is happening, resulting in a 
labor market segregated across gender lines.  The partial causation model 
does not apply to comparable worth claims.  In industries and occupations 
where the supply of individuals willing to work for lower wages does not 
meet the aggregate demand, if given the chance the employer will engage 
in wage discrimination, paying individuals willing to work for lower wages 
their reservation wage, and filling the remaining vacancies with individuals 
demanding higher pay.161  With the current economic meltdown, there are 
 
 160. The fact that some women are as effective as men when negotiating on behalf of 
third parties should be taken into account when an employer raises the argument that 
promotion of self-interest in pay bargaining is a relevant trait to the job in question. 
 161. See DAVID CARD & ALAN B. KRUEGER, MYTH AND MEASUREMENT:  THE NEW 
ECONOMICS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE (Princeton University Press 1995) (Questioning the 
assumption that competition drives employers to pay all employees within one industry or 
regional area a “market rate.”  Some employers are able to attract employees at below 
market rates, but supply of these below market wage employees does not meet demand.  
The authors argue that a small increase in the minimum wage will not necessarily result in 
higher unemployment rates, since mandating employers to pay higher wages through 
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reports that men are disproportionally the victims of layoffs, while the 
female unemployment rate has been increasing at a slower rate.162  Layoff 
decisions are keyed to labor costs and individuals with a higher pay 
productivity ratio, disproportionally men, are targeted.  This supports my 
argument that employers are in fact sustaining workforces with equally 
productive workers, performing the same work, for different pay. 
The libertarians’ concerns are well-grounded.  If you care more about 
managerial autonomy than sex equality, you should not endorse partial 
causation.  But libertarians should acknowledge that sticking with the 
causation model comes at a price.  Many sex-based compensation decisions 
fly under the radar.  Applying partial causation will curb managerial 
discretion, but it will also preserve the most important aspect of managerial 
discretion:  to design compensation schemes that promote productivity.  It 
will force management and human resource professionals to sit down and 
engage in serious deliberation and data analysis to identify factors and pay-
incentive mechanisms that actually increase productivity.  Advocating for 
partial causation is not equivalent to advocating for rank-based 
compensation.  To the contrary, it is about consciously tying individual pay 
to individual productivity. 
To the enthusiasts, I can only reply, “I don’t know.”  I have identified 
a special case, a specific area of discrimination law in which applying a 
relevancy test makes sense.  This is an area where traditional legal tools are 
of limited service.  Pay inequality is an issue too important to be left 
untreated.  After all, the essence of the employment relationship is work 
performed in consideration for pay.  The overwhelming majority of 
individuals participating in the paid labor market do so to earn a living and 
to support themselves and their families.  We have to make sure they are 
not being underpaid due to unfair and unlawful sex discrimination. 
 
minimum wage regulation will enable them to fill vacancies that existed when the employer 
paid below market rates that were above the minimum wage.). 
 162. See Barbara Hagenbaugh, Men Losing Jobs at Higher Rate Than Women in 
Recession, USA TODAY, Jan. 12, 2009, available  at 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2009-01-11-unemployment-rate-sexes_N.htm 
(“In the year since the recession began in December 2007, the jobless rate for men rose from 
4.4% to 7.2%.  At the same time, the jobless rate for women rose from 4.3% to 5.9%.”).  
Some attribute the differences in the rising unemployment rates as caused by the segregated 
labor market.  For example, female occupations such as those in the health and education 
industries were more insulated to layoffs than male occupations in the construction and 
manufacturing industries.  Id. 
